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ESSAYS
ESSAY ON PAPER PRESENTED BY AMBLER
MOSS & STEPHEN LANDE
OSVALDO R. AGATIELLO, S.J.D., PH.D.*
This paper identifies the key issues of, and interests that af-
fect, the process of trade integration in the Americas. This paper
also analyzes the political stakes and actors, and provides rec-
ommendations that encompass such diverse areas as monetary,
social, legal, infrastructure, and procedural policies. This stimu-
lating intellectual undertaking reveals that the absence of "fast
track" authority renders the Track I/Track II approach ineffec-
tual and provides no hope for a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) by 2005.
However, even if the countries involved could ultimately
agree upon a compromise blueprint for hemispheric trade nego-
tiations, farther-reaching queries remain unaddressed. First, it
is unclear whether trade will act as locomotive or caboose in the
process of deep integration for which the Latin Americans ap-
pear to strive. Second, it remains doubtful that the U.S. Con-
gress will ever admit that controversies arising from hemi-
spheric trade and investment will be ruled upon without
recourse by internationally-agreed upon procedures and supra-
national adjudication.
* The author is the Latin America Regional Coordinator at Baker & McKenzie. He
has been the General Editor of the quarterly LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
BULLETIN since its inception in 1993, which is available online at http://www.baker
info.com. The author is also the editor of a series of Baker & McKenzie books on Latin
America, including SECURITY INTEREST LAW IN LATIN AMERICA (1996).
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International trade dealings and negotiations use the lan-
guage of economic theory and interest. Thus, it is embarrassing
to admit that trade is a secondary structure which directly de-
pends upon the uncertainties of international security, changing
modes of production, and the availability mechanisms for money,
credit, and knowledge in the world.' Governments, whether
democratic or nondemocratic, have to accommodate tradeoffs be-
tween rational economic efficiency, external demands-both ra-
tional and irrational-as well as rational and irrational internal
resource allocation contests. International trade, despite its
many benefits in disseminating technology, equalizing down
prices across jurisdictions, and motivating voluntary relation-
ships, does not-and cannot, at least for now--control the gov-
erning agendas of countries. This proposition remains true to
the extent that one can speak only of an ideal, theoretical form of
an international trade "system" or "regime," because quantita-
tive restrictions, dumping practices, governmental and regional
subsidies, protectionist threats, and customs bashing are as or-
dinary today as competitive devaluations were in the inter-war
period.
Increased and freer trade enrich international relations,
and that is the right direction which countries wishing to im-
prove their welfare and potential should move. But, as the fail-
ure of trade boycotts reveals time and again, no uncontested evi-
dence exists to suggest that restricted trade thwarts peaceful
international relationships. 2  A more technical question is
whether countries, traders, corporations, and intermediaries
(securitization has made many a banker into a partner) are go-
ing to be advantaged by the creation of regional blocs rather than
by adhering to the current loose interlocking of bilateral, subre-
gional, and regional agreements or, conversely, by aiming for
multilateralism in the lines of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO). Govern-
ments of both industrial and developing countries, in their re-
lentless quest for jobs, tax revenues, technology, know-how, and
expanded markets, fiercely compete with each other to capture
foreign direct investments by granting to foreign investors tax
and financial privileges that frequently collide with their trade
1. See Susan Strange, Protectionism and World Politics, 39 INT'L ORG. 234 (1985).
2. Renato Ruggiero, Director General of the World Trade Organization, made this
claim in The High Stakes of World Trade, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1997, at A18.
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pledges. In the name of free trade, inefficiencies are built into
bilateral, regional, and subregional agreements 3 that entrench
mercantilist negotiating positions and conspire against global
productivity, as UCLA professor Sebastian Edwards and World
Bank economist Alexander Yeats suggest. 4
The discord between the expanded-Mercado Comdin del Sur
(MERCOSUR)-versus-expanded-North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) approaches yields yet another question: will
the FTAA be a short document like MERCOSUR or a mountain-
ous lawyerly creature more similar to NAFTA or the GATT/WTO
agreements? In the Latin American experience of the postwar
era, particularly that of the ill-fated Latin American Free Trade
Agreement (LAFTA) and the original Andean Pact, closely-knit
lawyerly agreements are the best deterrent to trade and invest-
ment growth. The import substitutions and Soviet containment
theories of those times nurtured urban industrial elites and mili-
tary dictatorships throughout Latin America. In the present
day, all fledgling Latin American democracies embrace free mar-
ket nostrums (albeit with differing zeal and priorities) and have
generally discarded the costly hypotheses of conflict with their
neighbors that used to dominate their foreign policy and budget
agendas. Still, the European integration model-economic inte-
gration as the driving force to eradicate all wars, which De Gas-
peri, Schuman and Adenauer advocated in the 1920s and formal-
ized in the Treaties of Rome of 1957-provides a comforting
metaeconomic inspiration to many Latin American politicians.
It is ironic that, as this feeling sweeps across South America, the
Clinton administration succumbs to the temptation (with the
strong resistance of the Secretary of State) of thrusting $1 billion
worth of military mat6riel upon some Latin American govern-
ments.
As long as the U.S. executive and legislative branches of
government do not address the administration's pledge for a pro-
gressive extension of NAFTA to the entire continent, the pre-
dominant model for economic integration south of Chiapas will
3. This also includes those of countries, states and municipalities with multina-
tional corporations.
4. Sebastian Edwards, Nafta Offers Latins Little They Can't Have Now, WALL ST.
J., April 18, 1997, at A19; Alexander J. Yeats, Does Mercosur's Trade Performance Justify
Concerns about the Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements? Yes!, Processed, 1996.
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continue to be the vibrant MERCOSUR. Despite its many prob-
lems, it already accounts for more than half of Latin America's
output. Some even forecast that MERCOSUR will be "the core of
an agribusiness and mining superpower, with a diversified and
modernized manufacturing industry fueled by cheap and abun-
dant energy."5 The United States, which exports to Latin Amer-
ica (including Mexico) more than it exports to either the Euro-
pean Union or Asian Pacific countries (excluding Japan)-a
trend likely to intensify over time--cannot indefinitely play the
role of a voyeur of this promiscuous process of hemispheric inte-
gration.
5. A Survey of Mercosur: Remapping South America, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1996,
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